Irish Railway Record Society

CIÉ’s B121 Class General Motors Diesels

  BRIAN SOLOMON

AMERICAN IMPRESSIONS

In IRRS JOURNAL 172 (June 2010), I detailed Córas Iompair Éireann’s (CIÉ) 141/181 Class locomotives at the time of their withdrawal from regular traffic. In this article, I’ll take a detailed look at CIÉ’s B121 Class (later the ‘B’ was dropped), which were placed in traffic fifty years ago this year. I’ve had more than just a passing interest in the 121s. These locomotives, commonly known as ‘Yanks’, seemed familiar to me from the time I first laid eyes on one at Limerick shed some 13 years ago. Having come from in the United States, I had grown up with General Motors ‘switchers’ (‘shunting locomotives’ in Ireland). These were once very common in American yards and on local and branch line freights (even today, a few can still be found working). Yet, it was this familiarity that immediately caused me to misjudge the 121. Appearances can deceive; I incorrectly presumed that since the 121 looked like an American switcher, ‘switching’ was its intended purpose. A few days after my initial sighting, I boarded the Limerick-Limerick Junction shuttle under the roof at Colbert Station. I thought it was quaint that the train was shunted to the platform in traditional fashion using Irish Rail switcher No. 128 (by 1998, very few switchers were still used in this manner in the USA). You can only imagine my surprise when the same locomotive departed with the three Mk III carriages in tow! I was even more astounded as we came up to speed. In America, switchers were largely confined to slow speed duties. Only in very rare instances did they stray out on the mainline with a passenger train in tow, and then they wouldn’t reach more than 30 mph. By contrast No.128 was soon hurtling along at nearly 70 mph.

Since that day in February 1998, I’ve come to learn far more about the 121s than I ever imagined I would. In addition to making numerous images of these locomotive in traffic, and travelling behind them on a variety of occasions, I’ve had the opportunity to review a great deal of 121-related literature. Recently, during the research for this article, I uncovered considerable material about CIÉ’s early interest in General Motors diesels and details about the 121 Class. I was surprised to learn how early the officers at CIÉ had formally contacted GM in regards to diesel; much earlier than I previously thought.

EARLY CIÉ INTEREST IN GM DIESELS

General Motors was still relatively new to the locomotive market in 1947, when it caught the interest of CIÉ. A letter from H.G. McClean, Export Manager of General Motors Electro-Motive Division (EMD) to CIÉ Chairman A.P. Reynolds, dated 28 May 1947, illustrated the efforts of General Motors in development of diesel-electrics for all types of traffic in the United States, stressed the company’s success in the American market, as well as the versatility and high availability of its locomotives, while pointing out benefits offered by its highly refined 567 diesel and other standardized systems. Specifically, this letter noted,

“We [EMD] now contemplate entry into the export Diesel electric locomotive business, and realize that this involves the design, manufacture, and test of new models. In these new designs we are anxious to retain the proven features which have been so successful in service on the domestic models, combined with the advantages resulting from the production of export standards suitable for application. We accordingly enclose herewith copies of a preliminary specification prepared from a design deemed suitable for general usage. We would greatly appreciate your comments on and criticisms of this specification, directed to the suitability of the projected models for the operating conditions on your system. . . .”

He continues,

“We are anxious to assist you in any studies you may be making around the application of Diesel motive power to your system and to place at your disposal the facilities built up within recent years such as reports on application studies, traffic operating recommendations, and comparative operative costs. Should you desire us to make such studies we should be pleased to receive from you the appropriate details of the physical characteristics of your system, the traffic requirements, and your basic steam operating costs.

“We hope to maintain regular contact with you and to welcome your executives on visits to this plant.”

This initiated more than a decade of communication that ultimately resulted in the acquisition of 15 General Motors GL8 diesel-electrics. In the meantime, CIÉ implemented the early stages of dieselisation, while General Motors helped complete wide-scale North American dieselization by selling thousands of locomotives to railroads across the United States, Canada, and Mexico from its plants in the US and Canada. As suggested in the 1947 correspondence, General Motors ultimately entered the locomotive export market — a field already the domain of the two traditional American locomotive manufacturers, Alco and Baldwin. It should be noted that while EMD was busy mass-producing diesels for lucrative American market, it was hesitant to devote too much effort in development and construction of more specialized locomotives necessary for the peculiarities of the export market. Instead, General Motors’s early export efforts largely involved the licensing of its technology to manufacturers in other countries. Sweden’s Nydqvist & Holm Aktiebolag (commonly known as NOHAB) was among GM’s world-wide partners, and specifically focused on European sales.

Although CIÉ’s early dieselization favoured British manufacturers, the company demonstrated both a keen interest in GM products and an understanding of the advantages of GM diesels over those of other manufacturers. In an inter-official memo, dated 11 September 1947, R.T. Hinchcliffe, Production Manager at Broadstone made these comments to the General Manager at Kingsbridge, regarding the specifications of offered by GM.

“The three sizes of units specified appear to be applicable to our requirements as regards power output etc., and would give comparable performances with the units we are purchasing from Sulzers [sic]. The axle load is suitable for all our main and secondary tracks.”

He further notes,

“It is known that General Motors are producing these units on standardised basis which ensures maximum interchangeability of components, a very attractive feature as it allows very economical maintenance. I do not think Sulzer’s units are quite up to this standard in this respect as from what I can gather they produce the diesel units against each contract on a general engineering basis.”

By the mid-1950s, EMD had entered the export market, and was offering several standard models with variations built to suit a wide range of track and loading gauges. CIÉ’s Chief Mechanical Engineer, O.V.S. Bulleid, made detailed consideration of GM diesels in 1952, and GM offered a CIÉ a proposal for its model LC-1 for service on Irish railways. Bulleid explained in an internal communication to the General Manage at Kingsbridge on 20th March 1952,

 “The General Motors Corporation proposal would be worth considering to obtain experience with medium power diesel passenger train locomotives, both more quickly than with our own locomotives and with an alternative design, using a high speed engine.”

Bulleid exhibited his familiarity with the capabilities of GM diesels while noting that he had known GM’s Mr. H.G. McClean “for very many years”.

In 1953 and 1954, during the tendering process for the A and C class locomotives, CIÉ’s General Manager F. Lemass engaged in correspondence with GM’s European partner, NOHAB, initially expressing interest in the potential of NOHAB-built diesels using GM components (similar to those acquired for operation on railways in Sweden and Denmark). NOHAB was then building locomotives similar in output and axle-weight to those specified by CIÉ during its early phase of dieselization. Despite the excellent reputation of GM diesels, and CIÉ’s early interest, Lemass’s later correspondence with NOHAB offered an unexplained reluctance to further entertain the company’s locomotive. This was much to the surprise of the manufacturer, which appeared very eager to do business in Ireland. Fairly early in this phase of dieselisation, Metropolitan Vickers emerged as the preferred supplier. Other offers by American locomotive builders were also rebuffed. In letter to Ashton C. Bonnaffon, Esq., General European Agent for The Pennsylvania Railroad in London (which in effect represented Baldwin Lima Hamilton in Britain and Ireland), F. Lemass squashed any hint of that manufacturer doing business with CIÉ, writing: “There is no question of the Baldwin Locomotive Company supplying our railway with locomotives, and I cannot understand how the rumour originated.”

Undaunted, in 1955, EMD drafted profile drawings for a variation of its G8 export model specifically tailored to conform to the Irish loading gauge with special consideration to changes necessary to work with CIÉ’s 5’ 3” track gauge.

CIÉ’s preference for British built locomotives was partly related to difficulties in obtaining necessary currency with which to buy American-made diesels, but it is also understood that there may have been degree of pressure on CIÉ to favour British industry. So despite the proven superiority of GM diesels in regard to reliability, availability, and maintenance costs, CIÉ put off buying GMs for a decade, yet in late 1958 it finally made the leap. CIÉ’s diesel procurement process and purchase of the 15 model GL8, class B121s was detailed in JOURNAL 172.

ONE MAN IN THE CAB

Key to CIÉ’s successful dieselization was its early acceptance of one-man locomotive operation. Report T.444, issued by CIÉ’s Office of the Staff Relations Officer at Kingsbridge Station, Dublin, on 8 September, 1955 discusses the importance of one-man operation:

“Introduction of diesel locomotives operated on an economic basis will, it is hoped, have the effect of reducing the loss on railway working to an extent that will ensure the continuation, and perhaps an increase in rail borne traffic. The locomotives which have been purchased by the Company have been designed in a manner which ensures perfect safety with one man driving. The cab at each end provides for control from either side and there are, therefore, no duties . . . to be performed by a second man on the locomotive.

It would render the whole diesel programme uneconomic if a second man were to be employed where, in fact, there are no duties for him to perform. The economics of the whole scheme and the hopes of saving the railway which arise there from, would be jeopardised by such wasteful employment of labour.”

As a result, introduction of wide scale dieselisation in Ireland coincided with one-man locomotive operations. Although, there were a number of provisions where for safety reasons or operational convenience it remained desirable for two-man diesel operation. Ireland’s successful implementation for one-man diesel operation predated that of many other countries. (Many CIÉ firemen were reassigned to the ‘Traffic’ Dept as porters etc.) In the United States, it was agreed in the late-1940s to retain locomotive firemen. Furthermore while the fireman was finally phased out in the 1980s, to this day most freight operations in the USA still require two-man locomotive crews. Yet, a caveat to Ireland’s anomalous one-man operation had significant implications regarding the operation of its first GM-built diesels. This was a deciding consideration in operating the 121s with cab leading in most instances and also key to the decision to buy subsequent GMs with dual cabs.

GL8 CONSTRUCTION AND SPECIFICATIONS

In 1960, General Motors adapted its standard G8 export model into the GL8, a lightweight, end-cab type built on a shorter frame, and largely adhering to the switcher pattern established in America during the 1930s. Thousands of end-cab switchers had been built for North American railroads by the time CIÉ placed its order for 15 GL8s in 1960.

GM’s first GL8s had been for Taiwan, which ordered a variation featuring A-1-A bogies (three axle bogies, centre axle unpowered) to accommodate that country’s exceptionally light axle load. By contrast, CIÉ’s GL8s, as were most others, used the common Bo-Bo wheel arrangement. Other countries also bought GL8s, including lines in Tunisia and the East Bengal Railways (at the time this was East Pakistan, subsequently becoming Bangladesh). Of special interest were the several railways in Brazil that ordered them. Ultimately, 69 of the type were exported to the South American country. (As in Ireland, many Brazilian railways use 5’ 3” gauge.) Ireland’s locomotives were built at EMD’s LaGrange, Illinois plant in December 1960. These were probably constructed alongside GP20s (2,000 hp Bo-Bo) built for America’s Great Northern Railway.

The General Motors Diesel-Electric Operating Manual for model GL8 Locomotives, 2nd Edition, issued to CIÉ employees in January 1961, at the time the B121s were delivered, provides detailed specifications and instructions for operation. The GL8 was powered by EMD’s standard eight cylinder 567CR diesel engine, which could produce 875 horsepower continuous output to the D25E main generator, this delivering 600 volts for distribution to four series-wound direct current traction motors. (The GL8 could be ordered with either EMD’s D29 or D47 traction motors, depending on the specifications of the railway.) The 567CR diesel was a proven 2-cycle design, scavenged with a Roots Blower and adapted to idle at 275 rpm and under full speed, at 835 rpm. The gross continuous output rating was 950 hp, which included power required for auxiliaries as well as the 875 hp necessary for traction. Typical of EMD diesels, the control system provided eight running positions on the throttle (plus ‘idle’ and ‘stop’). In each running position, the output of 567 engine and D25E generator were nearly perfectly matched, which allowed for continuous operation in any throttle position without risk of damage to equipment, unless the locomotive was grossly overloaded. In America, diesel locomotives are typically equipped with sanders and sand reservoirs to distribute sand on the rail head in front of driving wheels to improve adhesion. Although the B121s were so equipped with sanders (and were delivered complete with sand), the sanding system was deactivated to comply with a ban on the use of sand in Irish operations. One of the caveats to this change was that B121s wouldn’t necessarily be capable of offering maximum tractive power as specified by EMD; however, since the locomotive would tend to slip long before the motors overheated, it also made it virtually impossible to overload the motors.

To aid in operation of the locomotive, EMD provided a panel of coloured warning lights, colloquially known by CIÉ drivers as ‘the Christmas tree’. The manual described these lights as visual warning for operating difficulties with the following system; “ . . .ground relay, hot engine, wheel slip, and pneumatic control relay open”. It further noted that on locomotives equipped with vacuum brakes, “the lights will also include vacuum brake release, vacuum brake application, and low vacuum”. Detailed explanations described why each of the lights might illuminate as well as the appropriate actions to be taken. For example,

“The ground relay light will be illuminated whenever the ground relay trips. In such instances the unit concerned will not develop power and the engine will remain at idle and not respond to throttle.

The light is extinguished and power restored by resetting the ground relay. This is done by isolating the unit or placing the throttle in idle, then momentarily depressing the reset button on the engine control panel.”

Regarding the hot engine alarm light, the manual notes, “This light operates in conjunction with the alarm bell to warn the engineman that the engine cooling water has reached excessive temperature.”

The lights had a tendency to reflect in the cab-windows, this was deemed a distraction, which contributed to decision to remove the ‘Christmas tree’ from the cab.

DIFFICULTIES CAUSED BY B121’s SINGLE CAB ARRANGEMENT

Adoption of single man diesel operation was facilitated by equipping earlier road locomotives with cabs at each end. These included the Sulzers (class B101), and Metropolitan Vickers built A and C class locomotives. Although GM’s model GL8 was an end-cab type, it had been designed as a bi-directional locomotive and had operated bi-directionally in the United States and elsewhere for decades. As ordered, CIÉ anticipated working the locomotives bi-directionally with a single man in the cab. This plan was foiled when a relatively minor accident that occurred early in trials with B121s on the mainline revealed sighting difficulties when operated with the cab in the rear. This accident was discussed by author D. Renehan in IRRS JOURNAL 112 (June 1990) and also in IRRS JOURNAL 174. However, the following information offers a greater level of detail than previously published. Reviewing this material more than fifty years after the incident may offer alternative perspectives both as to the situation that caused the accident and the conclusions drawn in reaction to the accident.

CIÉ file AM 505/01, title General Motors Diesel Locomotive, covers a variety of correspondence and material from 1961 to 1964 relating to GM diesels in Ireland. Of special interest is discussion of the collision on Monday 20 February 1961 at the 17¼ mile post on the Dublin-Cork line when the recently-delivered GM locomotive B129 struck a platelayer’s bogie on the track. At the time of the collision, the locomotive was operating with the ‘cab in the rear’ (later described as ‘cab trailing’), which led to immediate concerns about single man operation of the locomotives in this manner with the ‘bonnet-first’ (or ‘bonnet leading’) orientation. Supplementary information provided in a draft reply to a Parliamentary Question noted that the collision occurred in daylight and stated:

“The platelayer’s bogie was on the track and the usual protection was provided by having a flagman on duty and by placing detonators on the track no less than ¾-mile in advance of the bogie. Impact took place at about 10 miles per hour and slight damage was caused to equipment.

An enquiry was held and it was established that accident was due to the following causes :-

1)   Failure of the driver to hear the detonators exploding.

2)   Failure of the driver to see the flagman.

3)   Inability of the driver to see the bogie on account of a curve in the line.”

The report also indicated that a medical examination of the driver revealed that “his eye-sight was below the required standard, and due to an eye disease had diminished very rapidly since his previous examination on the 13th September, 1960”. It was also noted that driver’s hearing was examined and found to be in good order.

As a result of the accident, “experiments were made to determine the audibility of detonators in the driving cab. It was found that with the cab in the leading position, or with cab window open the audibility was satisfactory. [However] with the engine in the leading position [operating ‘bonnet first’] and with the windows closed the audibility was insufficient due to the effect of the materials used for sound and thermal insulation in the construction of the cab. As result it was decided to modify the cab construction so that audibility would be satisfactory in all situations”.

At that time, CIÉ still intended the B121 class to serve as intended as bi-directional machines. To this effect the report noted,

“Pending the completion of these modifications the locomotives will be driven on line services with the cab in the leading position. The locomotives are geared to operate equally in either direction.”

Despite this action, cab in rear operation resulted in further objections and concerns in regards to safety. Specifically, Mr. T. P. Hogan, the Railway Inspecting Officer, and Mr. Buckton, representative of the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Fireman voiced concerns. Significantly, Mr. Buckton had issued a letter on Thursday 16 February 1961, concerning cab-in-rear operation, which was noteworthy because it predated the accident at milepost 17¼ by four days.

Aiming to address concerns, while looking to establish safe practices for operating the B121 with cab in rear, CIÉ ran a series of trials with the locomotives ‘bonnet-first’ on some of the lines they were intended to work. Officers at CIÉ, suggested that drivers could handle trains in a safe manner with improved visibility of the line and signals made possible by, “putting his head out of the window”, “crossing from one side of the cab to the other”, or “standing on platform in front of the seat”.

One trial was conducted with B134 on Friday 7 April 1961 between Amiens Street (renamed Connolly Station in 1966) and Rosslare Harbour, over the former Dublin & South Eastern (D&SER). The details were reported in a letter by Inspector Halpenny dated Tuesday 11 April 1961. He noted that “the purpose of this run was to find out if this type of engine could be worked by a driver with the driving cab in rear of engine”. A report from Train Crews’ Training Officer V. P. Hand noted that other tests were conducted on the Northern and Midland lines. He highlighted specific difficulties regarding visibility from the cab of a B121 when with the ‘bonnet leading,’ including: “On the D.S.E. Section . . . it was impossible to negotiate the Wexford-Wexford South Section over the Quay with any degree of safety.” In the same report he also explained, “These tests were carried out on the D.S.E.R. and Northern section under ideal weather conditions and in daylight, while on the Midland section on the first day of the trial weather conditions were poor with heavy rain and limited visibility — it was on this day that viewing through the top windows was found to be most unsatisfactory due to condensation and rain drops.” Hand concludes, “In my opinion, the most important aspect of the problem to be resolved is the degree to which the proper observation of the line ahead and the approaches to station is affected by the restricted forward vision with bonnet leading, rather than the sighting of signals.”

A memo date Monday 10 April 1961 from Locomotive Inspector F. Brogan, offers several objections to working bonnet-first including; “on unfavourable curves it may possible that a flagman would not be seen when travelling on such curves, although the driver may lean out [of the window], it is no advantage”, and “it would be difficult to keep time with Passenger [sic] trains if drivers were handicapped in the observation of Signals [sic] particularly during the hours of darkness.”

Further discussions and investigations failed to facilitate acceptance of cab-in-rear operation. In May 1961, Mr. Buckton of the A.S.L.E.&F. addressed several contentious points regarding B121 operation when driven with “cab in rear”:  Firstly, he wrote “it was regrettable that there had been no consultation with footplate staff” prior to the purchase of the B121s. Secondly, he noted that “drivers objected to moving from one side of the cab to the other and that it was the view of his members and his union that it was dangerous to expect drivers to move across the cab to get a view of fixed signals”, and that the modifications implemented to the B121 cabs in the form of new louvers produced a litany of complaints from drivers “because of draughts and the entry of rain through these openings”

A CIÉ memo from Friday 27 October 1961 to the Deputy General Manager sums up the feelings of the Mechanical Engineer at Inchicore, Lucas Collins. Previously he had pushed for bi-directional operation, but by this time seemed ready to concede his position and accept that the B121s would largely remain uni-directional.

“The Railway Inspecting Officer stated that he had given a lot of thought to our proposal (to operate the B121s with cab in rear) and that in his view the driver could fail to observe signals or make wrong observations if he was required to cross from one side to the other. He also referred to the obligation imposed on the driver by Rule Book [sic] to keep a good lookout and he felt that this could not be done from a General Motors Locomotive when travelling cab in rear. He stated that if the Board operated the locomotives cab in rear the Company’s rules in regard to the observation of signals and signal cabins, and in regard to keeping a good lookout, could not be observed as safely as in the past. He proposed, therefore, to report accordingly to the Department of Transport and Power.”

In acknowledging that there was little point in pursuing operating the intent of B121s with ‘cab in rear’, because of the previous cited concerns over visibility, Collins offered examining “the possibility of fitting a second cab to the existing General Motors locomotives”. Noting that “this proposal has been discussed with Messrs Terrell and Martin of General Motors in regard to new locomotives [ultimately GM’s model JL8, CIÉ’s 141 Class delivered in 1962], and they have indicated that such an arrangement can be adopted. It would be necessary to discuss with General Motors the possibility of adopting a similar arrangement for the fifteen existing locomotives.”

The office of the Department of Transport and Power issued a letter to CIÉ on Friday 14 September 1962 that seems to have effectively settled the operation of B121s in traffic:

“In the case of the General Motors locomotives with cab at one end it is understood that your Board does not operate these locomotives on running lines cab in rear except at certain places where it is necessary to do so in order to get them to turntables. These places include seven where the movement takes place within station limits (Cork, Mullingar, Tuam, Galway, Sligo, Drogheda, Dundalk) and two where runs between stations are made (Kingsbridge to Inchicore and Westland Row to Amiens Street). It is considered desirable in the interests of safety that a second man should be carried in the cab at all of these places where the locomotive is being operated cab in rear and that the second man should have the duty of assisting the driver as look-out.

Regarding movements generally in yards and sidings which are carried out under the direction of a shunter, it is considered that operation without a second man is acceptable, but special care is necessary on the part of drivers and shunters to ensure that the lines are clear before any movements with cab in rear are made.”

As result, general operation of the B121s has always been with the cab in leading, with exceptions provided as illustrated. Subsequently, provisions for cab in trailing operation of B121s between the North Wall and facilities or turntables at Amiens Street and Inchicore was also accommodated, as well as similar arrangements at various points on the system to reach goods yards from engine sheds.

After two years of discussion, on Thursday 18 April 1963, the Deputy General Manager (Operations) at Kingsbridge issued memo GM.72768/82 concerning the Operation of General Motors Locomotives which specifically identified ‘single-cab’ units and advised the following reminder to be inserted into the Weekly Circular,

“Observation of Rule No. 148

“The attention of Guards is called to Rule No. 148. It is essential that Guards working on light engines observe and obey all signals and keep a good look-out all the time the engine is in motion.”

Uni-directional locomotive operation had long been the norm with most steam locomotives in road service, and since the B121s overlapped with steam locomotive operation, most facilities for turning engines were already in place at the time of GM’s introduction. As a result, while inconvenient, the B121s uni-directional operation didn’t prove to be either operational or economically onerous. Yet, these difficulties with the B121s resulted in subsequent orders for GM diesels in Ireland for units with cabs at each end. This was significant for GM as well as Ireland, since it resulted in the manufacturer’s commercial development of dual cab diesels built at La Grange, the first of which were the model JL8, CIÉ’s B141 class delivered in 1962. This remained a standard feature of new locomotives in Ireland since that time.

Copyright © 2011 by Irish Railway Record Society Ltd.
Revised: January 04, 2016 .