Irish Railway Record Society

Journal 172

The 141/181 Class Locomotives

General Motors-built double-cab

Bo-Bo diesels in Ireland

BRIAN SOLOMON

In the early 1960s, Córas Iompair Éireann (CIÉ) purchased new four-axle General Motors diesel-electric locomotives. Each axle was motored, and as a result of their wheel arrangement, these became commonly known as the “Bo-Bos”, or by their individual class designation: 121/141/181 (in the early years these having a ‘B’ prefix before the number). For decades they worked passenger and freight services serving as an integral part of daily operations across the system. While their heyday passed years ago, the “Bo-Bos” soldiered on, and in their last few years largely worked on freight, permanent way, and pilot duties. In March of this year, IÉ withdrew from regular traffic the last remaining 141/181 class diesel-electric locomotives. Several have been preserved, but their withdrawal from regular traffic marks an important milepost in Irish railway operation, while presenting an opportunity to review their history and technological antecedents. The focus of this article is the early history of the double-cab 141/181 locomotives; however it is necessary to cover the history of General Motors, and of the role 121 class GM diesels to put the 141/181s in proper technological and chronological perspectives.

GENERAL MOTORS; DEVELOPMENT OF THE DIESEL ELECTRIC

During the mid-twentieth century, American automotive giant General Motors emerged as the world’s leading commercial diesel-electric locomotive manufacturer. Its dominance was neither an accident, nor did it transpire overnight, but it was the result of carefully calculated policies. In 1930, GM made two fortuitous purchases when it acquired both the Winton Engine Company and its primary customer, the Electro-Motive Company. Established in 1922, Electro-Motive was an engineering firm involved in design and production of self-propelled internal-combustion railcars for use on secondary and branch line passenger services in North America. Interestingly, while the company prepared designs, it did not actually manufacture its products, instead contracting construction to established builders. By the time GM acquired Electro-Motive, the domestic market for railcars had collapsed as a result of the Great Depression. In the early 1930s, GM helped redefine the mission of Winton and Electro-Motive. The railcar concept was expanded into that of an articulated diesel-powered high-speed streamlined passenger train. Custom-built trains were primarily powered by Winton model 201-A two-cycle diesel engines, a type initially refined for potential applications by the United States Navy. These sleek-looking Electro-Motive streamliners caught the attention of both railroad management and the general public, and so put Electro-Motive on the path toward large scale locomotive development and manufacturing.

Under GM’s wing, Electro-Motive substantially altered the way it did business. It built its own manufacturing plants, the first and most famous was its facility in the Chicago suburb of McCook, Illinois, commonly known by its postal address at La Grange. The company adopted mass-production techniques inspired by General Motors’ automotive business. Key to this strategy was adopting standardised components across its product line, and engineering standardised locomotive models, rather than adhering to traditional means of tailoring locomotive designs to the specifications of individual customers. Crucial to GM’s philosophy was engineering products in ways to insure component compatibility while allowing for design improvements that could be easily retro-fitted on older production models. Also by refining its designs and giving adequate time to work out potential flaws, the company’s engineers were able to ensure a high-level of reliability, while minimising per unit engineering costs.

Where its earliest diesels had been streamlined power cars, the largest existing diesel market in the USA was for yard switchers (shunting locomotives). In 1936, Electro-Motive began selling standard end-cab switching (shunting) locomotives. These were bi-directional and featured a single operating cab at the rear of the locomotive. Next it developed a line of independent streamlined locomotives, known as ‘E-units’, for high-speed long-distance passenger services. Early on, Electro-Motive recognised that the Winton 201-A diesel was ill-suited to the rigours of hard railroad service and set out to design a new engine for the basis of its locomotive design. Using experience from the 201-A, the company developed the all-new 567-series engine specifically for rail applications. Consistent with the company’s philosophy was the 567s modular arrangement. So 567 engines of various outputs were determined by the number of power assemblies and didn’t require substantial engineering changes. This allowed engines of different sizes (6, 8, 12, and 16 cylinder arrangements) to share most fundamental components. This increased reliability of the engine design, minimizing engineering, and simplified parts supply. The 567 diesel made its debut in the 12-cylinder format in 1938; first used to power production-built E-unit models. Soon, the 567 had entirely displaced production of the older 201-A design and for the next 27 years variations of the 567 design were standard in Electro-Motive diesels. Over the course of its production, the engine underwent several important design improvements aimed at increasing output, improving reliability, and lowering maintenance costs.

Perhaps the most significant milestone in Electro-Motive’s product line was development of its model FT in 1939. Initially marketed as a 5,400 hp four-unit freight diesel this was the first application of the 16-cylinder 567 diesel and designed to rival the output of the latest American steam power while offering substantial savings in the areas of maintenance and service. The FT was the tool General Motors needed to change the way American railroads viewed and bought locomotives. GM’s FT demonstrated extraordinarily high tractive effort and the ability to work for extended periods on the most difficult mainline freight and passenger assignments with minimal need for servicing. In 1940, as the FT was entering regular production, General Motors reorganised its locomotive business as the Electro-Motive Division, and the initials ‘EMD’ came to represent GM’s American diesel business. Although General Motors was not first to develop a commercial diesel locomotive business, its practices and locomotive types established the new business model and redefined the way locomotives were developed and sold in North America.

World War II had a multifaceted effect on diesel locomotive sales and development. The sudden increase in demand for locomotives strained American railroads to capacity, while strict rules enforced by the War Production Board limited both the number and types of locomotives EMD and other manufacturers were allowed to produce. Although there was no limit on research and development, to avoid complexities in parts supply, the WPB imposed restrictions on implementing major design changes until 1945. In the war-time environment, EMD road diesels ran up tens of millions of miles allowing its engineers to refine designs without the need to immediately satisfy competitive concerns.

After the War, EMD introduced a host of new models using much improved variations of its established diesel locomotive technology. Very quickly, EMD rose to the top of the market. For the next decade its diesels were purchased in large numbers to enable North American railroads to make the complete transition from steam to diesel operations. Although a few mainlines were not completely dieselised until 1960, by 1956 the vast majority of the American railroad network had completed dieselisation. EMD had the lion’s share of locomotives in service.

ORIGIN OF THE ROAD SWITCHER

Initially EMD offered only a few basic locomotive types. While in a few instances it configured locomotives for specific customer applications, the vast majority of its production was standard catalogue models. Early production consisted of switchers in the 600 and 900 hp categories, E-unit road passenger diesels, and the general service/freight service F-units. Rather than implement many small changes to its models, EMD tended to implement changes en masse by introducing new model types in each of its locomotive categories. New models reflected improvements in output, reliability, and ease of maintenance. For example, in 1946 the new F3 supplanted the original FT.

In the late 1940s, growing sales of road-switchers by its primary competitors encouraged EMD to develop its own road-switcher types. Where EMD’s Es and Fs used an enclosed streamlined-styled truss-structure ‘carbody’ (similar to that used on the ‘A’ and ‘C’ class diesels built by Metropolitan-Vickers for CIÉ) with an elevated forward-facing cab and reinforced nose for crew protection, road switchers were built using a utilitarian ‘hood’ design. Established by switcher-types in the 1930s, this used a platform covered by a non-structural sheet-metal ‘hood’ to protect equipment. Where the carbody types were essentially unidirectional, and thus either required turning at terminals or needed to be worked in multiple, road-switchers were essentially bi-directional machines with a single cab. Most road-switcher types featured a cab position about one third the way along the locomotive, with portions of the hood at either end. This placement was intended to offer crews a degree of protection in case of collision, especially at grade (level) crossings with highways. Unlike in Ireland where historically there has been a high degree of level crossing protection, North American railways suffer from especially lax grade crossing protection and at many such crossings were protected only by warning signs advising motorists to use caution. The results were inevitable, as most railway-men will attest, and crew protection in locomotive design reflects the high-rate of crossing accidents.

The road switcher type offered great versatility. It could perform most duties of both switchers and road diesels; it worked in yards, on either branches or the mainline, in heavy freight, fast freight, or passenger services, and could work either singly or in multiple depending on the amount of power required. EMD’s four-axle road-switcher types from their model designation initials GP for ‘General Purpose’, were commonly described as ‘Geeps.’ These rapidly became the best selling diesel of the 1950s and effectively replaced the F-units in EMD’s catalogue. Most common was model GP9, a four-motor type powered by the 16-567C engine. The ‘C’ suffix indicated an improved 567 design that was universally adopted in new locomotives built from 1954.

GENERAL MOTORS EXPORTS

Until the mid-1950s, EMD focused its production on North American railways.

Then, as North American railways approached complete dieselisation and domestic sales tapered off, EMD looked toward the overseas market to boost sales. Locomotives marketed outside the United States tended to be under the General Motors name, rather than EMD’s. Since lines overseas operated with different weight restrictions and variously different loading gauge requirements than found in America, GM adapted road switcher designs into standard export models. These were defined by approximate horsepower output for traction without specific consideration for wheel arrangement, in contrast to domestic production models that clearly distinguished one model from another on output as well as wheel arrangement. Export models could be ordered with a variety of different trucks depending on the customer’s weight restrictions and desired tractive effort. Initially, its two standard export models were the G8 using an 8 cylinder 567C rated at 950 hp engine output, 875 hp for traction and G12 using a 12-567C rated at 1,425 hp engine output, 1,310 hp for traction. Both resembled domestic road switchers in regards to cab and hood placement, but were designed to conform to more restrictive loading gauges and lighter axle-weights than typical of North American railways.

            In 1960, GM supplanted the G8 with a new model, designated GL8, which employed the same basic equipment, but using a lightweight body style derived from its end-cab switcher line, rather than its heavier road-switcher. This was shorter and more compact, yet still rated at 875 hp for traction.

CIÉ INITIAL DIESELISATION

CIÉ initiated large-scale dieselisation in the mid-1950s. By October 1958 the first phase of its changeover from steam to diesel traction had been completed. In addition to 66 diesel mechanical railcars, 108 mainline diesel electric locomotives, 5 diesel electric and 19 diesel hydraulic shunting locomotives had been placed in service, as well as 3 experimental diesel hydraulic locomotives for operation of broad-gauge branch lines. Diesel equipment was not purchased for beet specials, fair specials, overload trains, permanent way trains and some shunting duties, which were estimated to amount to 1 million miles per annum of steam working. CIÉ had opted to retain the best of the old steam locomotives for those services pending the development of a satisfactory design of turf-burning steam locomotive, of which 50 to 70 would be built. Among the mainline diesel locomotives acquired were 60 ‘A’ class Co-Cos and 34 ‘C’ class Bo-Bos built in Britain by Metropolitan-Vickers with Crossley diesel engines. They had also obtained, 12 B101 class locomotives equipped with A1A bogies (centre axle unpowered) and Sulzer diesels. All of these served as mixed traffic locomotives.

The genesis of GM power on CIÉ is found in the Review of the Change from Steam to Diesel Traction, a report prepared by Chief Engineer, Dan Herlihy, following a visit to the USA, and submitted by him to the General Manager in November 1958. The report stated that the CIÉ dieselisation programme had not come up to original expectations in two respects; mileage covered, and repair costs. For the purpose of evaluation, the performance of the CIÉ diesel locomotives was compared with that of eight US railroads and the published records of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The most significant findings were that American diesel locomotives had a higher availability (85% as against 78% for CIÉ) and a greater reliability, and that manpower required for maintaining American units was significantly lower at 2.2 men per locomotive compared with 3.2 on CIÉ.  It was also noted in the report that “the vast majority of locomotives in the US have been manufactured by one firm – General Motors – and this has helped in developing a locomotive whose reliability influences the whole pattern of American performance.”

The report also stated that the experimental turf-burning locomotive was not a success. It was meant to have the same capacity as one of the 1,200hp ‘A’ class diesel locomotives, and axle load should not have exceeded 14 tons for system-wide route availability. As built, it possessed a number of inherent defects which prevented it being employed in traffic with any regularity of dependability; it developed very much less power than an ‘A’ class locomotive; and the axle load was about 22 tons!

Thus CIÉ was still faced with the problem of how to reduce the number of coal-fired steam locomotives that were still working 1,707,300 miles per annum. In addition, that portion of the Great Northern Railway Board’s system that lay in the Republic was amalgamated with CIÉ from 1 October 1958. Steam working was still predominant on those lines and contributed an additional mileage in excess of 1 million per annum.

To support his case for procuring new diesel locomotives Herlihy, commissioned two foreign consultants in 1959 to make a study of the railway’s dieselisation and then provide recommendations on further diesel acquisition. Both were acknowledged as experts in diesel traction; Mons. Charles Tourneur of Société National de Chemin de fer Français (SNCF) and also President of the O.R.E Committee of Experts on Diesel Traction, and Herr Friedrich of Deutsche Bundesbahn, and President of the U.I.C. Sub-Committee on Diesel Traction. Their analysis of CIÉ’s diesel service requirement was detailed in a letter dated 21 September 1959. Among their observations:

“The Crossley two-stroke motors [diesel engines] fitted to Class A and Class C locomotives gave rise to many difficulties, which occurred successively and entailed modification and much intervention by the makers, making an appreciation of maintenance costs very difficult. The condition of the motors [engines] which we saw under maintenance at Inchicore was furthermore unsatisfactory and certainly beneath that of most Diesel locos in service in Europe. It would appear that this situation is due to the following factors:

—The motor [engine] as a concept dates back a long time and is adapted from a marine engine not specifically suited to the exigencies of railway service. The performance of these engines recalls previous experience with similar engines now withdrawn from service.

—The 2 stroke [cycle] engine is more difficult than the 4 stroke as regards adjustment to the varying speeds imposed by rail traction. This is why the 2 stroke is very little used in Europe and should be noted that perfecting the American 2 stroke motor by General Motors, now very successful, took a lot of effort; it is however an engine designed specially for traction.”

They continued in their assessments, largely echoing data provided to them by Herlihy, and made specific notes regarding new acquisitions:

“The services to be performed by the Diesel locomotives to be purchased, require two types of locomotiv [sic], the axle load not to exceed 14.5 tons (14.73 metric tonnes) thus being similar to almost all equipment in service.”

The first group of new locomotives discussed was of low-powered types for shunting and service on secondary lines and is beyond the scope of this article. The second group was;

“locomotives for mixed services class K, about 15 in number which would have to be capable of performing goods-train service (particularly hauling train loads of beet) as well as special passenger trains service involving light and fast trains consisting of 7 30-ton wagons on bogies. The maximum speed of the locomotive would be 70 mph (113km/h) and the maximum tonnage to be hauled on goods services would be from 600 to 650 tons. On gradients of 1/80 (12.5) mm/m [sic] with this tonnage should not fall below 9 mph. Such performances call for a locomotive on bogeys, because of the maximum speed required and a Diesel power of 800 h.p. would be necessary. [sic].”

Among their recommendations was a suggested re-powering of ‘C’ class locomotives with a more powerful engine to generate between 800-1,000 hp. The remainder of their assessment was regarding utilisation, necessity for spare locomotives, and spare parts.

Armed with this report, the company moved forward, and internal correspondence from 22 February 1960 (ref GM.72841/60) describes the tendering process that ultimately resulted in CIÉ’s acquisition of its first General Motors diesels. On 27 October 1959, CIÉ advertised a request for tenders for a variety of new diesel locomotives, including 15 ‘K’ Class locomotives with a specification of 800 hp and estimated to cost £50,000 each. By 22 January 1960, CIÉ had received 64 separate tenders from 29 different firms. Estimated prices varied considerably ranging from a 1,060 hp diesel hydraulic costing £37,475 tendered by Billard & Cie, to a 800 hp diesel electric costing £71,750 tendered by North British Locomotive Co. Ltd. Several American manufacturers submitted tenders, including Alco with a 1,050 hp diesel electric, and General Electric which offered several different diesel electric types ranging from 700 hp to 1,320 hp. (At that time Alco was General Motors chief domestic competitor, while General Electric only competed for export sales; soon GE would enter the domestic American market, and spur a renewed ‘horsepower race’ that encouraged EMD to implement significant technological advances.) Sitting squarely in both cost and horsepower output was a bid from General Motors for a 950 hp diesel electric type costing £52,742. At this time no model was mentioned.

By 1 April 1960, CIÉ had culled the tenders to just a handful of the most suitable bidders, discussed in detail in an internal document on the Diesel Locomotive Project (ref P.12/5) from Chief Engineer Herlihy to the General Manager. He was obviously especially keen on General Motors bid, and he proposed a visit to La Grange in order to inspect the type of locomotive offered by General Motors, and observe tests of a new type of bogie suggested for speed service on the proposed CIÉ order. Herlihy wrote, “A critical inspection of the type of equipment offered is necessary before deciding to make a formal recommendation for the expenditure of £833,413 in accepting the tender from General Motors Export Corporation for 15 K class diesel electric locomotives of 925 h.p.”

            He continues by detailing the particulars of the tenders, “All of this data has been considered together with the general information known to the engineering staff and the result is that the acceptance of the tender for General Motors locomotives is likely to be recommended.” Among the considerations were estimated repair and overhaul costs, and the anticipated availability and reliability of new locomotives. This weighed heavily in favour of the General Motors product which had one of the best reputations world-wide. Herlihy explained, “If the more expensive locomotives should be more reliable than the others, their extra capital cost would easily be more than offset by lower upkeep costs.”

Also considered was the slightly higher output of the GM diesels over other suitable tenders. At 925 hp, the new diesels were anticipated as being more or less interchangeable in service with the existing B101 class Sulzers. A final consideration that had tipped the scales in favour of GM was the American firm’s rapid delivery schedule. GM estimated an average 8.8 month delivery for the locomotives, which was about half that of the next closest competitive bid: “General Motors delivery time is about seven months shorter than the earliest of the other suppliers. This would mean that a number of steam locomotives would be eliminated so much earlier. The extra cost of steam over diesel is, at least £6,000 per annum per locomotive, so the earlier delivery for General Motors Locomotives [sic] would be worth about £3,500 per locomotive.”

Herlihy goes on to discuss the particulars of GM diesels in question and justifies their high price. His comments offer a visionary interpretation of CIÉ’s locomotive needs, while displaying his exceptional understanding of the machines he hoped to purchase. “The early delivery of General Motors locomotives has a financial implication that could be regarded as an offset to their high price. Their reputation as locomotive manufacturers is high. The locomotives they offer are not identical with the thousands in use in the United States because the horse power needed by C.I.E. is much lower. Its permissible axle load is also much lower.”

His analysis continues, “. . .The engine is a particular version of the standard General Motors’ product. The bogies are said to have been tested to 90 m.p.h. but overseas railways do not have the occasion to use them at more than 60 m.p.h. The main difference between the G8 and the GL8 offered to C.I.E. is a shorter frame. The difference, if any, in the bogies requires to be checked [sic]. Up to this the 925 h.p. G8 and the 1,425 h.p, G12 had the same frame. The reduction in frame size for the new GL8 is said to be a matter of more apt and economical design. The General Motors’ representative advises that all future 925 h.p. locomotives will be to the new GL8 pattern, except in the case of earlier purchases who would like to standardise the old pattern. At the present time, seven GL8 locomotives are being manufactured in La Grange for Formosa [today known as Taiwan]. Some G8 locomotives for Egypt have been completed. Arrangements will be made for C.I.E representatives to test the bogies on these at 70 m.p.h. . . .”

B121s SET PRECEDENT FOR LATER PURCHASES

A visit to La Grange was authorised, and the trip by J.J. Johnston, Assistant Mechanical Engineer (Technical) was productive. The role of the CIÉ Mechanical Engineer, Lucas Collins, at this juncture was also critical in that he was instrumental in arranging the U.S. dollar funds required. By July 1960, a contract between CIÉ and General Motors Overseas Operations had been sealed and construction of 15 GL8 locomotives was soon in progress. (A note on the manufacturer’s model number is worth including at this point: G = single cab; L = lightweight underframe; 8 = 8-cylinder engine) The single end-cab configuration was common to EMD switching (shunting) locomotives since 1936, although the GL8 cab profile was significantly lower than typical of North American designs in order to accommodate more restrictive structure gauge clearances on Irish lines. The locomotives were delivered to Dublin in January 1961, and because of their power rating they became known officially as the B121 Class, the class ‘K’ designation, used in earlier documentation, having been dropped prior to delivery. In their early years, the B121s were commonly known as ‘Yanks’ as described in an article by D. Renehan in IRRS Journal 112 (June 1990).

Initially, there was concern about the B121s braking ability. Internal communication from CIÉ Mechanical Engineer, Lucas Collins to General Manager F. Lemass, on 31 January 1961, explains that during preliminary tests of the B121s, the rate of brake application and release “was slower than the accepted standard for other C.I.E. locomotives.” However, following adjustments to the braking system as recommended by General Motors, the brakes were deemed satisfactory. The locomotives entered traffic in February 1961. In general the B121s were well regarded and gave good service, yet several noteworthy design concerns emerged.

            In their earliest days, the B121s were operated as bi-directional locomotives with the bonnet-end (or the ‘hood-end’—as known in the USA) deemed by GM as ‘front’. In the USA, end cab switchers had been designed in a manner that effectively emulated steam locomotive orientation, and, as previously described, the practice of operating them hood-first was deemed as preferred since it offered engine crews greater protection in the event of collision. Based on this philosophy, many American lines had operated switchers in pairs and deliberately oriented with cabs facing one another and hoods facing out. However, in most instances when in road service, American practice also required two crewmen in the cab, one on either side of the locomotive, in part to observe line conditions. D. Renehan describes an incident during trials that forever changed the orientation and operation of the B121 class, and resulted in significant design changes to all CIÉ’s future locomotive orders:

Driver Mick Kealey was working B133 bonnet first, when he passed over a series of detonators at Sallins placed to protect a permanent way trolley. Normally these would have provided amply audible warning to allow the driver to stop safely his train prior to the obstruction. However, it seems the detonators went unheard, (a condition partially attributed, after the fact, to sound proofing inside the cab), and B133 struck and demolished the trolley while injuring a member of the permanent way. D. Renehan notes that Kealey never drove again, and instructions were issued requiring B121 locomotives to be operated cab-first when leading trains.

Another continuing difficulty with the B121 was braking arrangement that featured just a single brake block on each wheel that limited braking ability of the locomotive. While less of an issue with vacuum braked passenger trains, this proved problematic with loose-coupled heavy goods, and limited the B121 to just 48 loose-coupled wagons, as compared with 61 wagons hauled by the B101 Class Sulzers.

            Despite these difficulties, overall the reliability and performance of the B121s proved outstanding. A letter of 9 May 1961 to Monsieur Charles Tourneur at SNCF from F. Lemass (General Manager at Kingsbridge) hints at the satisfactory operation of the B121s:

“My Chairman, Dr. C.S. Andrews, and myself will visit Paris on our return journey from Germany, and we would like to discuss with you certain aspects of the operation of the diesel locomotives supplied by General Motors Corporation, and in connection with which you were good enough to submit a report, in consultation with Mr. Friedrich.”

MORE LOCOMOTIVES CONSIDERED

The success of the B121s, combined with CIÉ’s desire to complete dieselisation as soon as possible (because of the comparatively high costs associated with steam locomotive operation and continued difficulties with ‘A’ and ‘C’ class locomotives) led the railway to consider acquisition of additional ‘B’ class locomotives in 1961. Consider the comments of Lucas Collins, Mechanical Engineer at Inchicore to the General Manager at Kingsbridge in a letter dated 12 September 1961, “As a result of the number of locomotives failing because of major defects, the number of locomotives out of service for repair has been abnormally high . . . The major defects are largely confined to the diesel engines on the ‘A’ and ‘C’ class locomotives and to the electrical machines on the ‘B’ class (Sulzer) locomotives. The ‘B’ class (General Motors) locomotives have given excellent performance to date and have been very reliable in service.”

He explains how General Motors diesels had been allocated to passenger services on Northern and Midland routes to “minimise the effects of failures” and it was then proposed to shift three of the B121 GMs to the Cork-Dublin route for the same reason. While noting, “ ‘A’ Class locomotives will continue to be used for the 10.40 am and 3.30 pm services for which the General Motors locomotives are not sufficiently powerful.” He then explains,

“The poor performance and high maintenance costs of the ‘A’ and ‘C’ class locomotives has reached a stage where serious thought must be given the problem of securing adequate and reliable motive power for main line services. This problem has been considered in the formulation of proposals for complete dieselisation which I hope to submit to you shortly.”

At the time, CIÉ’s railway operations were undergoing significant changes, both as a result of previous dieselisation and because of aforementioned difficulties associated with the Crossley engines, as well as facing the implications of proposals put forth in the Beddy Report to curtail service on selected lightly-travelled branch lines. As a result, CIÉ’s managers had difficulties in deciding the exact number of locomotives needed to fulfil traffic requirements. This resulted in considerable analysis by management and a good deal of discussion. Principal considerations affecting motive power considerations were illustrated in a report from Deputy General Manager (Operations) D. Herlihy to the General Manager at Kingsbridge dated 22 November 1961 (AM. 50506):

“1. The numbers of the diesel locomotives which would be required to operate the present railway or, alternatively, a smaller railway rather like that shown in the Bedde [sic] report. In each case, calculations have been made of the effect on locomotives carrying, or not carrying, beet.

            “2. The engineering problems which exist at present, and the additional problems likely to arise in the future in the performance of the 94 Crossley locomotives under the headings of —

            break-downs in service.

            cost of maintenance and repair.

            spare parts in the event of Crossleys [sic] going out of business.

            “3. The small amount of useful life left in the steam locomotives and the consequential risk of not being able to transport the business on offer unless more diesel locomotives are acquired quickly.

            “The first of these issues is one of economies in the commercial sense and the second is one of economies in the engineering sense.”

Herlihy offered several alternatives. One of which would have included purchasing 48 ‘B’ class diesels along with conversion of a pair of narrow gauge diesels, then operating on the West Clare, for broad gauge operation. A more conservative alternative—which assumed that no line cuts were implemented, and would leave the railway without surplus locomotives, required the purchase of just 34 additional ‘B’ class diesels, the re-engining of 20 ‘C’ class diesels to replace the unreliable and underpowered Crossley engine, and also continued steam operations during the beet season until at least 1967. Herlihy noted that the mechanical engineer advised purchase of 56 additional [‘B’ class] locomotives, in order to provide for “extra motive power to overcome some of the defects in the existing fleet, such as reducing the break-downs in service and reducing the mileage of ‘A’ Class locomotives.”

This recommendation was drawn from a very detailed report issued in November 1961. It had been prepared jointly by the Mechanical Engineer, Lucas Collins, and Assistant Mechanical Engineer (Maintenance), Matt Devereux, and carefully analysed the condition of the locomotive fleet, the nature of traffic and utilisation, while offering recommendations for future locomotive acquisition. At that time, CIÉ was still working 900,000 miles per annum by steam locomotive and had 140 steam locomotives in its active fleet, of which 50 were allocated to cover regularly timetabled trains and departmental trains, but not beet or weekday special movements. The relative costs per mile of various types of diesels in CIÉ’s active fleet was also deemed worthy of discussion. The maintenance cost for the ‘A’ class was calculated at 17.16 pence per mile, the ‘B’ class Sulzers (B101) 15 pence per mile, and the ‘C’ class 12.47 pence per mile. The report considers, “the average cost for the ‘B’ (General Motors) class locomotives since they were placed in service is 2.74 pence per mile, but this will increase to a figure estimated at 11.61 pence per mile when heavy examinations fall due.” It is important to remember that at the time, the B121s were still very new and CIÉ hadn’t developed much of a track record with the GM type.

The November 1961 Mechanical Engineer’s report also illustrated cost difference in fuel and oil consumption between the different types. Specifically, it highlights lubricating oil costs: ‘A’ class were costing 3.16 pence per mile; ‘B’ Sulzers 1.16 pence per mile; ‘C’ class 2.79 pence per mile, and B121s just 0.90 pence per mile.

The report included a detailed section titled, “Additional Diesel Locomotives to Improve Reliability and Performance” that suggested design changes for the future order(s) of ‘B’ class locomotives. As the single-cab B121 class were operationally restrictive, the matter had been discussed with GM who had indicated that for any further orders they could offer a double-cab arrangement. Secondly, the report highlighted advantages of substituting double-headed ‘B’ class locomotives on services that were, at that time, the domain of the ‘A’ class; “There are 28 of the present workings which are beyond the capacity of the new ‘B’ class locomotives. Of these fourteen are important services for which performance in respect of reliability and time-keeping would be considerably improved if double-headed ‘B’ class locomotives were substituted for ‘A’ class units.”

The failings of the ‘A’ and ‘C’ class presented significant consideration in the Mechanical Engineer’s motive power assessment:

“The performance of the ‘A’ and ‘C’ class locomotives has been unsatisfactory due to the poor reliability and maintenance cost of the engines. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the re-engining of these units since such a scheme might affect the proposals contained in this report for complete dieselisation.

“The Crossley engines fitted to the ‘A’ and ‘C’ class locomotives have had a very poor record. Apart from inherent defects, such as noise, vibration and oil leakage, many of the major components failed in the early period of service. The design of these components was, therefore, changed, and they were replaced under guarantee throughout the fleet.

“In spite of the corrective action taken by the manufacturers during the guarantee period and substantial number of modifications subsequently carried out by ourselves, the position is still unsatisfactory and failures for the ‘A’ and ‘C’ class locomotives are due mainly to engine defects.”

The report details the nature of these defects and recommends re-engining of 19 ‘C’ class locomotives to ‘B’ class power. However, GM had indicated that it was unlikely that they would undertake the replacement of the engine-generator sets, and there were only two other diesel engine makes that could be considered, namely, Sulzer and Maybach. It was this recommendation that led to the re-engining of C233 and C234 with Maybach MD650 engines rated at 980hp. It is important to recognise the order that the recommendations occurred and remember that re-engining ultimately occurred after purchase of additional GM locomotives. Had CIÉ’s experience with the Metropolitan-Vickers built Crossley-powered locomotives proved substantially better, it would have been much more difficult for the Mechanical Engineer to justify the added expense of buying more new General Motors locomotives, let alone the ultimate repowering of the ’A’ and ‘C’ classes.

 The recommendation contained in the ME’s Report for 56 ‘B’ class locomotives, as well as the base case for 48 units, was the subject of internal discussion and by 7 November 1961 it was agreed that a quantity of 37 new ‘B’ class diesels should be obtained. This was approved by the Board on 14 November 1961, and the order put out for tender.

In February 1962, the Mechanical Engineer’s Department reviewed 32 tenders supplied by ten different manufacturing concerns. A detailed report issued to the General Manager at Kingsbridge highlights the specifics of the tenders, and the recommendations of the Mechanical Engineer. Among tenders, there were three from General Motors: one for a single cab design along the lines of the B121 class, and two different double-cab designs. There was also an offer from Brugeroise et Nivelles for a twin-cab diesel-electric using a General Motors engine. The report illustrates how the offers were pared down, and why many of them were rejected. From this we can learn why General Motors was ultimately selected to build the 37 locomotives, despite not offering the lowest per unit price. This repeated the procedure established during the tendering process for the B121s, but offered several new considerations as a result of CIÉ’s B121 experiences:

“All offers based on a single cab design have been eliminated as locomotives of this type are considered unsuitable for single-man operation because of driver’s visibility. Other offers incorporate engines which are very highly rated [produce more power than required by the specification-BS] or which have only recently been developed for traction service. These offers have been eliminated and also any offers with average delivery promises in excess of 21 months.”

Only five tenders remained after the initial cull. Of these, General Motors’ tender for a double-cab diesel electric at a cost of £59,930 per locomotive was by far the most expensive based strictly on a per unit basis. The lowest tender considered after the cull was by Hawker Siddeley Brush for a twin-cab diesel-electric powered by a Maybach MD650 engine at the cost of £51,060 per unit. As with the B121s, GM’s accelerated delivery schedule proved an important cost consideration. Where the other four tenders quoted average delivery times ranging from 17.6 to 18.4 months (with some locomotives taking as long as 23 months for delivery), GM promised an average delivery time of just 7.35 months, with the whole order completed within nine months. Since CIÉ was desperate for new locomotives, time was of the essence. Thus GM was clearly favoured for this and other reasons as the report articulates, “Sufficient experience has been gained with the 15 General Motors locomotives, which have been in service for 12 months, to justify accepting this make of locomotive as satisfactory without further investigation.”

The report continues by weighing higher per unit price against the advantages of GM’s speedier delivery schedule and calculated savings from operating costs based upon; “reduction due to the substitution of diesel for steam motive power . . . [R]eduction due to the transfer of diesel mileage from ‘A’ class locomotives to the new locomotives . . .[R]eduction in footplate staff due to decrease in steam working. . . [I]ncrease due to interest and depreciation charges on the new units.”

A specific comparison in cost savings was drawn up between GM’s tender and that of English Electric’s, the latter’s being deemed typical of the non-GM proposals. GM’s significantly earlier delivery schedule being the primary difference in cost estimates:

“The saving due to reduced steam working in the case of General Motors locomotives amounts to £270,285 and to £51,066 in the case of English Electric locomotives. There is, therefore, an additional saving of £219,219 in favour of the General Motors units.

“By utilising the new locomotives on some workings at present operated by ‘A’ class units it is estimated that the difference in transferred mileage would be greater in respect of the General Motors locomotives to the extent of 1,400,000 miles, equivalent to a saving of £107,625.”

A further savings of £60,750 was estimated in favour of the GMs as result of reduced footplate staff from being able to discontinue steam locomotives earlier. “Savings . . . have to be offset by the earlier incidence of interest and depreciation charges for the General Motors locomotives as compared with English Electric units and using the same basis of calculation as adopted in the two previous reports this amounts to £148,623.” The report concluded that based on 37 locomotives, the General Motors tender represented a nett saving of £6,458 as compared with the English Electric tender. Yet when compared with the actual price per unit offered in the respective tenders, the GM locomotives were still more costly. So, the report further supported the GM tender, explaining,

“There are, however, other potential savings in favour of General Motors locomotives because of standardisation with existing types and because of the earlier cessation of general repairs to steam locomotives. No estimate of these savings has been made because of difficulty in making an accurate evaluation.”

The report continued to compare differences in financing the various locomotive purchase options and concludes,

“It is recommended that the tender from General Motors for the supply of 37 locomotives be accepted immediately and the total capital expenditure is estimated at £2,284,345.”

CIÉ placed its order for 37 General Motors JL8s on 4 May 1962, for a total contract price of £3,194,761. At that time, CIÉ believed the locomotives had life expectancy of 40 years.

Copyright © 2010 by Irish Railway Record Society Limited
Revised: January 04, 2016 .