Irish Railway Record Society
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JOHN O’MEARA
We all know the old saying – accidents happen in the best regulated families! Well the same can be said of companies, in the present case, a railway company. However, statistics show that railway accidents are comparatively rare, but when they occur, they seem almost inevitable, fated somehow – ice on the rails, thick fog and sometimes an element of human error can all contribute to a serious mishap, as the story I am about to relate will demonstrate.
The 12.45 am North Wall-Sligo goods train became divided between Enfield and Moyvalley because its engine could not take forward its load. A following goods, the 2 am North Wall-Galway, collided with the rear portion of the Sligo train. The Galway goods was derailed, as were 26 wagons and a brake van from the Sligo train, and some wagons from both trains were destroyed. The driver and fireman of the Galway train were slightly injured but, fortunately, recovered after a few days. No other injuries were reported.
The Sligo train was hauled by locomotive No. 53, a MGWR J16 0-6-0, built in Broadstone in 1880. It became GSR No. 567 and was scrapped in 1950. Five of its class had been scrapped by 1928. Its load was 39 vehicles, of which 35 were laden; three were empty horse boxes for Mullingar, and a brake van.
The Galway goods had 24 laden wagons and a brake van and was hauled by locomotive No. 127, a 4-4-0 D5 class, was built in 1903 in Broadstone and scrapped in 1955. On amalgamation it became No. 545.
The scene of the accident was in close proximity to Moyvalley down distant. The double line in this neighbourhood had a general direction from South East to North West and the southernmost set of rails was used for down traffic. The signal cabins at Nesbitt Junction and Moyvalley were switched out at this time so the block posts were Enfield, about 31/2 miles south of the collision, and Hill-of-Down, 5 miles in a north-westerly direction. Measured from Hill-of-Down signal box at the east end of the platform, the distances to the following points were:
Down home signal 231 yards, Moyvalley station 5 miles 700 yards, site of collision 5 miles 1,330 yards, Moyvalley down distant 5 miles 1,430 yards, and Enfield station 9 miles 400 yards.
Driver Kerrigan of the Sligo goods had difficulty throughout the journey because of a very hard frost and leaves on the line with slipping retarding progress. As a result, the goods arrived in Enfield about 15 minutes late. After watering, oiling and attending to the fire, it left 18 minutes late. Approximately 1,000 yards from Moyvalley station the gradient changes from falling to rising and there were trees on each side of the railway. On the night in question there had been snow, adding to the slipping. At 3.30 am the train was brought to a stop and despite several efforts at sanding the rails there was not enough adhesion for the engine to proceed with its full load. At this time, a down train was travelling on a falling gradient, and locomotive No. 53, though seemingly weak, nevertheless was steaming well.
After consultation between the guard and driver of the Sligo train, it was decided that it should be divided and go forward with the front portion to Hill-of-Down, the nearest point where sidings were available. and then return for the second portion. The train was divided between the 19th and 20th vehicle and guard Owens gave driver Kerrigan the necessary order at 3.51 am to return with the engine on the ‘wrong line’.
After the first portion had departed, Owens walked back to his van for detonators to protect his train in accordance with Rule 217. Before starting to walk back, he cleaned the glasses of the off side van light and of his own hand lamp, which, at a subsequent inquiry, he admitted were blurred. He estimated that these tasks took about five minutes.
Meanwhile, the first part arrived at Hill-of-Down at 4.25 am and stopped midway on the down platform where signalman Tuite was standing. Driver Kerrigan told him the train was divided near Moyvalley and that after shunting his wagons he planned to return, tender first, wrong line, to pick up the second portion.
While the shunting was taking place at Hill-of-Down, Owens began walking back along the up line to lay the detonators. He had walked about 60 yards when he saw two lights in front of him. By his own account he was taken by surprise and did not immediately recognise that they were engine lights. They could hardly be bicycle lamps! Before he had time to place the detonators on the rails, the locomotive of the Galway goods had sped swiftly by and within 15 seconds or so collided with the rear portion of the Sligo goods. Its speed at point of impact was estimated to be about 30 mph which was regarded as normal for that part of the section with no wind blowing. As the night was snowy and frosty, it would have been expected that Owens would have heard the oncoming goods.
Driver Scannell, Broadstone Depot, working the Galway train had watered his engine at Enfield and was running near schedule. He drove from the right of the footplate. Because of curvature, his view of the red side and tail light would have been about 60 yards. He barely had time to close the regulator and apply his engine brake before the collision happened. He estimated that his speed was 25-30 mph and said he had been going well since leaving North Wall.
Signalman Kenny at Enfield stated that the Sligo goods was accepted by Hill-of-Down at 2.40 am. It arrived in Enfield at 2.58 am and left at 3.10 am. The clock in the cabin, in accordance with an entry in the train record book, had been checked at 10 am with ‘Dublin Time’ on the 15 November, and found to be correct. The train record book showed that the Galway goods arrived in Enfield at 3.54 am and, not having received a ‘train out of section’ from Hill-of-Down for the Sligo goods, Kenny kept the starting signal at danger. He rang Tuite in Hill-of-Down and asked him if there was any sign of the Sligo train to which he replied that it had passed him ages ago. On being queried as to the time of passing, Tuite said that he had given ‘train out of section’ at 3.35 am but Kenny stated that he had not received such signal. He then asked Tuite if he was ready to accept the Galway goods and he said he was. At 4.10 am, when it was ready to depart from Enfield, Kenny again rang Tuite and asked the same question. Again the reply was positive, so Kenny cleared the down starter and the train departed. Five minutes later, at 4.15 am Tuite rang Kenny and asked if the Galway had left, as the Sligo was just then coming into Hill-of-Down. He did not know it was the first portion of a divided Sligo. Kenny replied that it had left at 4.10 am after being 12 minutes there.
At a subsequent Inquiry, Tuite agreed with Kenny’s statement regarding the telephone conversation that took place at 3.45 am, but said that the Galway was offered to him by bell signal, not by telephone. At this time, 4.10 am, Tuite could see the headlights of the Sligo train as it neared his station. He had no reason to believe that it was not going through, thus clearing the way for the Galway goods, which, erroneously, he then ‘took on’ from Enfield under the ‘line clear’ arrangement.
Tuite, I am sure, was a relieved man until the Sligo stopped at the down platform. The driver told him that the train had been divided near Moyvalley and that after shunting the train to the long up siding, he was going back ‘wrong line’ to collect the second portion. Tuite’s reply was: “No. Stay where you are; things are bad.” By now, he was deeply concerned about having accepted the Galway goods, as he knew that the section was anything but clear, and hoped that the driver would see the stationary portion of the Sligo in time to avoid a collision. He had also realised his grave mistake in telling the Enfield signalman that the line was clear. Other acts of folly he committed were: his reluctance to call out his stationmaster until 5 am and the alteration in the train record book concerning the arrival time of the first portion of the Sligo goods, making it illegible.
Tuite confessed that he knew it was irregular to correct entries in any train record book by rubbing out the originals. He further admitted that when he saw the headlights of the Sligo’s engine, it possibly could have been as much as two miles away on a lengthy curve.
J. W. Pringle, Assistant Secretary, Public Safety and General Purposes Dept., Ministry of Transport, London, who investigated the accident, reported that: “Tuite had about three years total service with his Company and had been employed as a signalman on a full time basis at Hill-of-Down for one year. On 16 November he came on duty at 10 pm and was rostered to work until 6 am. He had previously signed off duty at 10 pm on the night before. After coming on duty he had no signalling work to do until 2.35 am, when the Sligo goods was offered to him by Enfield. He stated he passed the time reading and denied, on questioning, that he had either left his signal cabin or fallen asleep. He could not give an explanation of his irregular behaviour, and in reply to the question as to why he told Kenny that the first goods was ‘away long ago’, he stated that it was the usual signalman’s reply.
Pringle, referring to Tuite’s behaviour, said he was callous, and had expressed no remorse for his behaviour. He also was at a loss to think of any excuse for Tuite’s cold conduct, other than the possibility that, whilst being fully aware, by his own admission, of the Blocks Rules which should have governed his action in signalling traffic, he had been mislead by the example or methods of other signalmen. Pringle also stated that there was so much divergence in the times given by various witnesses for the several instances in this case, that it was difficult to say how much time actually was available after the Sligo was divided for Guard Owens to protect the remainder of his train.
By his own admission, the engine with the first portion left at 3.55 am and the accident occurred not more than seven minutes later, that is, at 4.02 am. According to Enfield signalman Kenny’s evidence, the 2 am goods did not leave his station until 4.10 am – a time already written into the cabin’s Train Record Book. If that was true, at least eight minutes must have been occupied in travelling the 31/2 miles to where the rear portion of the divided train stood. This would fix the approximate time of the collision at 4.15 am, which showed that Owens had 20 minutes at least to go back about 1/2-mile and protect train by placing detonators on the line.
Guard Anderson, on the 2 am, in a separate interview, stated that the time of impact was 4.15 am, which he had noted in his Guard’s log book. This statement demonstrated that the accident might have been avoided if Owens had carried out his duties promptly in accordance with Rules 221 and 217.
The Investigator also said that, with due regard to the curvature and physical features of the railway in proximity to the scene of the accident, he did not consider that Driver Scannell could reasonably be found guilty with failing to stop short of the standing vehicles.
Mr. Pringle concluded his report by stating that he understood the MGWR, in common with other railway companies, found it difficult, in the prevailing labour conditions, to find reliable men for signal work. However, he said, it was necessary to call attention to statements made, and the attitude adopted by signalman Tuite, and to point out the desirability of more reliable training of candidates for the responsible positions of signalmen, and closer supervision of the work of signalmen generally, so that irregularities in Block working might be checked, and strongly advocated these practices. Tuite was removed instantly from his post as signalman, and left the Company shortly afterwards.
On examination, the brakes of both locomotives involved in the accident were found to be in perfect working order. No record exists of any admonition to Owens regarding his failing to protect his divided train according to the rules. The down line from Enfield to Moyvalley, with the latter cabin switched in, was open to traffic next day.
Copyright © 2007 by Irish
Railway Record Society Limited
Revised: August 12, 2007
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